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Abstract 
 
Mobile agent interaction is usually vulnerable to attacks from within 
and outside the agent’s execution environment. Also, the mobility 
property of mobile agents earns them the opportunity to migrate from 
one security domain to another. Intranet/LAN with connection to 
internet do, from time to time, experience agent visitation either for 
malicious purpose or for legitimate mission. To protect legitimate agent 
communication against attack by visiting agent, we propose a 
technique that restricts migration of the visiting agent and isolate it to a 
neutral host where its mission could be achieved. We refer to this 
technique as restriction-based access control mechanism (ResBAC). 
The proposed mechanism employs certificate authentication, re-
defining visiting agent itinerary path and visiting agent isolation to 
accomplish the aforementioned objective. The performance of the 
proposed mechanism is evaluated using scenarios to determine the 
strength of the mechanism in term of its ability to protect agent 
communication against the three major threats: man-in-the-middle 
attack, replay attack, and passive eavesdropping.   
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1.0  INTRODUCTION 
 
The mobility property of mobile agents earns them the 
opportunity to migrate from one security domain to 
another. Intranet/LAN with connection to internet do, 
from time to time, experience agent visitation either for 
malicious purpose or for legitimate mission. An 
occasion like this demands that the visited network 
domain be secure to forestall and check the possible 
malicious behaviour of the visiting agent. This could be 
achieved using an authorization policy. Some 
authorization policies  known in literature are 
Discretionary Access Control (DAC), Role Based 
Access Control (RBAC), Mandatory Access control 
(MAC) [1], and Privacy-aware Role Based Access 
control (P-RBAC) [2]. Not until now, there is none of 
these policies that isolates and confines the activities 
of visiting agent to a neutral host such that it is 
deprived of direct romance with legitimate agent 
communication. 
In order to prevent or shield visiting agent from 
interaction with the legitimate task agent 
communication, a Restriction-Based Access Control 
(ResBAC) mechanism is proposed to isolate visiting 
agent to network server and deny it the opportunity to 
establish communication thread with other network 
hosts. It is motivated by the need to ascertain that the 
execution environment of the task agents is devoid of 
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any form of interaction other than the collaboration 
required by the task agents to accomplish their 
designed objective. In the proposed model, an agent 
from a foreign security domain enters through the 
home security domain via the agent server as 
illustrated in Figure 1. The agent server is responsible for 
the scanning of the visiting agent against any 
malicious tendency. This scanning is necessary due to 
the fact that there is a possibility for a non-malicious 
visiting agent to have been inflicted with malicious 
code along its itinerary path unknown to the agent 
owner or its home network domain.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1 Restriction Based Access Control Model 
 
 
The agent server could apply integrated trust-based 
agent admission control with standard RBAC in Gray, 
O’Connell [3] in the admission of visiting agent into its 
home security domain. However, protection of agent 
platform against malicious agent attack is outside the 
scope of this study. The study covers only attacks that 
are capable of violating the confidentiality of agent 
communication such as man-in-the-middle attack, 
replay attack, and passive eavesdropping. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 
2 presents the related works while the proposed 
security mechanism is discussed in Section 3. In Section 
4, the performance evaluation of ResBAC is detailed 
and the conclusion is drawn in Section 5. 
 
 
2.0  RELATED WORKS 
 
Access control models usually achieve secure access 
control of resources from the viewpoint of the system 
[4]. They are categorized into: Attribute-based access 
control; Relationship-based access control; Role-
based access control; Task-based access control. 
 
2.1  Attribute-Based Access Control Model 
 
Attribute-based access control model defines access 
control policies based on various attributes of the 
client, data object or the environment [5, 6]. The 
concept of attribute-based encryption (ABE) is a 
promising access control technique that fulfills the 
requirement of access control methods that are 
cryptographically enforced [7]. It comes in two 
flavours: key-policy ABE (KP-ABE); ciphertext-policy ABE 
(CP-ABE). The KP-ABE attributes are used to describe 
the encrypted data and policies are built into user’s 
key. Cipher text policy ABE presents a scalable means 
of encrypting data such that the encryptor defines the 
attribute set that must be possessed by the decryptor 
to be able to decrypt the cipher text. Hence, different 
users can decrypt different pieces of data per the 
security policy. This approach to access control 
effectively eliminates reliance on storage server to 
provide unauthorized access to data. However, due 
to the possibility of a group of users sharing the same 
attribute to data access, the approach introduces 
some challenges with regard to attribute and user 
revocation. This simply means that revocation of any 
attribute or any single user in an attribute group would 
consequently affect all other users in that group. This 
will definitely create a bottleneck or degrade the 
security mechanism. 
 
2.2  Relationship-Based Access Control Model 
 
This access control model  is characterized by 
interpersonal relationships between users and 
expression of access control policies using these 
relationships in social computing domain [8, 9]. With 
this model, a data owner could control the release of 
his personal information the same manner he would 
control it in the conventional world [8]. The release of 
such information would be based on his relationship 
with the recipient of the data rather than the 
recipient’s role. One consequence of this is that 
people can hold multiple relationships with someone.  
Fong [9] widen the applicability of the model to 
application domains rather than the social computing 
domain such that authorization decisions are 
anchored on the relationship between resource owner 
and the accessor of the resource in a social network 
maintained by the protection mechanism. The work of 
Carrie [8] has made relationship-based access control 
mechanism a general-purpose access control 
mechanism. 
 
2.3  Role-Based Access Control Model 
 
Role-based access control system [10-13] allocates a 
given role to each user while permission to access 
data is assigned to the given role. With this access 
control system, if different people are requiring access 
to a record (example is medical record), they are 
provided different access depending on their roles 
(specialties) or a specific function the person is serving 
at a specific time. However, variations of this model 
are also known in literature such as Risk-aware role-
based access control [14]; claims-aware role based 
access control [15]. The essence of risk-aware role 
based access control is to provide a tool that can 
manage the trade-off between the risks involved in 
allowing unauthorized access with the cost of denying 
access when the consequence of inability to access 
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resources is severe. Claims-aware role based access 
control involves formulating a security token which 
specifies role information that corresponds to one or 
more roles of the entity requesting an action to be 
performed on a resource. The formulation entails 
accessing at least one or more claims with each 
having an expression concerning the requesting entity. 
The major success of role-based access control is its 
simplified management [4]. 
 
2.4  Task-Based Access Control Model 
 
Access Control Model (ACM) usually does not consider 
the context of a given operation during authorization. 
Task-Based Access Control model [16, 17] was 
proposed to address this by changing the attention for 
security access control from protecting static object 
and subject in independent system to protecting 
dynamic authorization performed with the tasks 
executing. The attendant advantages of TBAC are: 
dynamic allocation of permission; multi-point access 
control and distributed processing. TBAC model uses 5 
tuples (S, O, P, L, AS) to describe authorization. S 
represents the subject, O describes object, AS gives 
the authorization step, P specifies the permission 
activated by AS, and L is the survival period of AS. 
However, the notable features of TBAC are L and AS 
which distinguished TBAC from other ACMs.  
 When AS is activated, its agents begin to have 
central authority that it commissioned, as it also 
countdown its life cycle. During the lifetime of AS, the 
permission granted to the users dependents on not 
only the object and subject but also on the task 
currently running, task status, and user’s permission 
when task is active. Permission is frozen when task is 
suspended but restored when task resumes. Moreover, 
permission is revoked when task is terminated. 
 
 
3.0  PROPOSED MECHANISM 
 
Mobile agent is often faced with access control on 
entry into a security domain other than its home 
network domain. This is to avert the attendant risk 
associated with the failure to put adequate access 
control mechanism in place especially in a multi-agent 
system environment. Three security processes are 
usually utilized in access control namely: identification, 
authentication, and authorization [18]. The three 
processes are incorporated in the proposed 
mechanism. The identification and authentication (of 
visiting network domain) processes were performed at 
the agent server, while the authority to execute on the 
receiving network domain is granted or denied at the 
receiving network server. However, authentication of 
the visiting agent (using digital signature of agent 
server) is also performed at the network server to 
ascertain that it is sent from the agent server of 
receiving network domain. 
 On arrival of the visiting agent at the network server 
of the receiving network domain, an agent controller 
in the network server has to authenticate the signature 
on the visiting agent certificate by hashing the 
signature using 160-bit SHA-1 algorithm and compares 
the derived message digest with the message digest 
sent by agent server. If there is match, such visiting 
agent is allowed to execute on the platform, otherwise 
it is killed as shown in Figure 2. However, before 
permission for execution is granted, the visiting agent is 
isolated and its execution is confined to the network 
server in such a manner that prevents it from 
communicating with the legitimate task agents 
running in the execution host or their communication. 
The isolation of visiting agent to the network server was 
made possible by running it in a different type-space 
so that its movement and activities are limited to the 
space (running environment). Any attempt made by 
the visiting agent to reference the legitimate task 
agents running on execution host provokes a type 
error. 
Authentication is a primary security issue for the 
establishment of secure communications. Hence in this 
study, the digital signature authentication process is 
the only technique used to authenticate the visiting 
agent since its security is not of any importance to its 
receiving security domain. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2 Workflow design model of the proposed mechanism 
for inter-confidentiality protection of agent communication 
 
 
This technique denied the visiting agent the privilege 
to communicate with any other agents outside its 
runtime environment. 
The agent server first verifies the network domain of 
the visiting agent to establish the identity of the 
domain. This is done by sending verification request to 
the certificate authority of the receiving security 
domain, who contacts the certificate authority (CA) of 
the sending network domain. If the verification is 
successful and the identity of the visiting agent is 
established, the agent server then signs the visiting 
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agent certificate, hashes the signature and sends the 
message digest to the agent controller of network 
server. It is assumed that the two communicating 
network domains are registered with two different 
certificate authorities, who are responsible for the 
authentication of agent migrating across network 
boundaries as shown in Figure 3. 
Having verified the source of the visiting agent and 
established an identity for the agent, the second level 
of security is imposed. At this level, the agent server of 
the receiving security domain injects a new destination 
address into the visiting agent’s certificate. The new 
address depicts the address of the network server of 
the receiving network where the visiting agent will 
execute. In this study, controlled migration of visiting 
agent within the receiving network domain, agent 
identification, authentication and confinement of its 
execution to network server are referred to as 
Restriction-Based Access Control (ResBAC) 
mechanism. The essence of this technique is to restrict 
the hopping of the visiting agent to the network server 
of the receiving security domain. It is worth noted that 
agent identification itself is not a primary security issue. 
Since security related decisions cannot be made only 
by presenting agent identity, the second security 
process, that is, authentication was employed by 
appending the electronic signature of agent server on 
the certificate of any visiting agent visiting the 
receiving security domain. 
The most widely used access control mechanism is 
RBAC [FERREIRAabd, Ricardo [19]; Santos-Pereira, 
Augusto [18]] due to its simplicity and ease of 
administration. However, this authorization technique is 
not suitable for the proposed mechanism because the 
study is only interested in determining an authorized 
runtime environment for the visiting agent rather than 
the network resource access permission. The network 
resource access right of the visiting agent is outside the 
scope of this study. 
 
3.1  Experimental Setup 
 
In the experiment, we used a computer having Intel 
Core i5 CPU with 2.40GHz processor speed, 4GB RAM 
and 64 bits Windows operating system while Oracle 
virtualbox running Ubuntu Linux operating system (1GB 
RAM) was used for the agent execution host. The 
experiment was implemented using JADE framework 
and Java. It comprises of three JADE platforms running 
on the Windows and the Linus virtualboxes connected 
by a virtual local area network. The multiplatform was 
integrated using a computer running windows 
operating system on top of Ubutu Linux operating 
system version 6, which was installed using Oracle 
VirtualBox software. The local area network (LAN) 
facilitates communication between the three virtual 
machines. The Linux box is the Execution Host 
environment where the task agents run while the 
Agent Controller, certificate authority agent and the 
network server run on the Windows machine. 
When an external agent visits the receiving network 
domain, its origin and itself are authenticated at the 
agent server following the procedures discussed in 
Sections 3.3 and 3.4. If the authentication of the visiting 
agent is successful, the agent server then inserts the 
URL of the network server into its migration path such 
that it views the network server as the next host to visit 
and execute. At the network server, the visiting agent 
is isolated and confined to its runtime environment so 
that none of its activities goes beyond the 
environment. 
 
3.2  Certificate Authentication 
 
The focus of this paper is to protect task agent 
communication with the execution host against 
possible attack by a visiting agent. This was 
accomplished using certificate authority model. First 
and foremost, the agent servers of the two 
communicating network domains must engage in 
mutual authentication which shall be explained in the 
next section. Thereafter, the certificate of the visiting 
agent itself is authenticated before it could be 
allowed into the receiving network domain. 
 
3.3 Procedure for Authentication of Two 
Communicating Network Domains 
 
The procedure taken for the authentication of the two 
communicating network domains is illustrated in Figure 
3 and Figure 4, which is also summarized below: 
 
 The security administrator instructs the agent server 
of the sending network domain to send a SYNC 
request with its signed certificate to the receiving 
network domain. 
 The agent server of the sending network domain 
sends SYNC request with its signed certificate to the 
receiving network domain. 
 The agent server of the sending network domain 
hashes its signature (using SHA-1 hash function) and 
sends the message digest to the receiving network 
domain.    
 VERIFY operation at the receiving agent server 
works as follows: 
o If the certificate of the sending agent server is 
not with the receiving agent server, the 
receiving agent server request for its CA (CA2). If 
CA2 does not have the certificate, it requests for 
it from the CA of sending network domain (CA1). 
 The receiving agent server hashes the signature of 
sending agent server and compares the derived 
message digest with the message digest sent by 
the sending agent server. 
 The receiving agent server sends an ACK reply with 
its signed certificate to the sending agent server. 
The ACK reply acknowledges the successful 
authentication of the visiting agent certificate. 
 The agent server of the receiving network domain 
hashes its signature (using SHA-1 hash function) and 
sends the message digest to the sending network 
domain. 
 VERIFY operation at the sending agent server works 
as follows: 
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o If the sending agent server does not have the 
certificate of the receiving agent server, it 
verifies from its CA (CA1). If CA1 does not have 
the information, it sends request to CA2.  
The sending agent server hashes the signature of 
receiving agent server and compares the derived 
message digest with the message digest sent by  
the receiving agent server.  
 After the mutual authentication of the two network 
domains, the sending agent server sends the visiting 
agent with its certificate to the receiving network 
domain. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3 Network domains and visiting agent authentication process 
 
 
3.4 Procedure for Authentication of Visiting Agent 
 
The visiting agent certificate is modified to 
accommodate the new destination address that 
specifies the address of the network server as the next 
host to visit in its itinerary. Any agent sent to the 
network server for execution automatically implies that 
such agent is an visiting agent and all the access 
control policies defining the privileges of visiting agent 
will be invoked. Although the access control to 
network resources is out of scope of this study. The 
steps taken to authenticate visiting agent certificate 
are depicted in Figure 4 and summarized as followed: 
At the receiving network domain, 
 the security administrator (SA) instructs the agent 
server (AS) to sign the visiting agent certificate 
(ExAcert).  
 the AS signs the certificate of the visiting agent with 
its private key (ki), 
 SA requests AS to hash its signature and send the 
derived message digest (MD1) to network server 
(NS). 
 AS hashes its signature using 160-bit SHA-1 [20] 
algorithm and send digest response (MD1) to 
network server (NS), and AS dispatches the visiting 
agent (ExA) with its signed certificate to the NS. 
The network server carries out the following operation 
in order to authenticate the visiting agent: 
 
 NS hashes the signature of AS of receiving network 
domain using the same 160-bit SHA-1 algorithm to 
obtain digest response (MD2). 
 It then compares MD2 with the one earlier sent to it 
from the agent server (i.e. MD1). 
If there is match in the two digest responses (i.e. MD1 
and MD2), the NS then isolate ExA and hands it over to 
the access control mechanism (for resource access 
permission). The access control mechanism is 
expected to determine which network resource(s) to 
be made available for the visiting agents during 
execution. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sending security domain
Key
store
Key
store
Key
store
Key
store
Receiving security domain
Key
store
Key
store
Key
store
Key
store
Agent
server
Network
server
Host
platform
Agent
server
Network
server
Host
platform
Certificate authority (CA1) Certificate authority (CA2)
Certificate verification
 
6                              Olumide, Shukor & Abdul Hanan / Jurnal Teknologi (Sciences & Engineering) 77:13 (2015) 1–10 
 
 
      
 
 
2.  SYNC request (CSAS)
5.  Verification 
result (CSAS)
Agent 
server (AS) Keys & 
certificate 
stores
Agent 
server (AS) Keys & 
certificate 
stores
Sending security domain (SND) Receiving security domain (RND)
Keystore
Security
Administrator 
(SA) CA CA
1. Request to send SYNC 
request to RND
3. Notification of 
SYNC request
4.  VERIFY (CSAS)
6.  Notice of CSAS 
verification
7. Request to send SYNC 
request to SND
8.  SYNC request (CRAS)
9. Notification of 
SYNC request
Security
Administrator 
(SA)
10.  VERIFY (CRAS)
11.  Verification 
result (CRAS)
12.  Notice of 
CRAS verification
PHASE 1: Communicating
                   Network Domain 
                Authentication
14. Request to sign 
ExAcert
Network 
server
15. Request to hash AS 
signature and send MD1 
to NSt
13. SAS sends external 
agent with its 
cert. to RAS
16. Send ExtA with its 
signed cert. to NS
17. NS hashes AS 
sign. & comp. 
MD2 with MD1 .
18. If M1 = M2, NS
 isolate ExtA & 
Provide resources
 for execution
PHASE 2:  External Agent
                   Authentication               
 
 
Figure 4 Authentication of network domain and visiting agent 
 
 
4.0 PERFORMANCE EVALUATION AND 
VALIDATION OF ResBAC 
 
There is none of the existing access control 
mechanisms that delve with isolating visiting agent to 
a neutral platform. In view of this, the proposed 
ResBAC mechanism was evaluated and validated 
on the basis of its effectiveness to combat the three 
basic threats to agent communication between the 
task agent and agent controller in the execution 
host, using six scenarios:  
a. Man-in-the-middle-attack without the application 
of the proposed mechanism; 
b. Man-in-the-middle-attack with the application of 
the proposed mechanism; 
c. Replay attack without the application of the 
proposed mechanism; 
d. Replay attack with the application of the 
proposed mechanism; 
e. Passive eavesdropping without the application of 
the proposed mechanism; 
f. Passive eavesdropping with the application of the 
proposed mechanism. 
 
4.1 Man-in-the-Middle Attack with and without the 
Proposed Mechanism 
 
Man-in-the-middle attack is one of the most 
important attacks upon cryptosystem. It involves an 
adversary making independent connections with the 
communication channel through which the task 
agent communicates with the execution host and 
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relays messages between them so as to believe they 
are communicating directly to each other over a 
private connection.  
For example, before task agent is transmitted to EH, 
AS asks EH for its public key [EH(kj)]. If EH sends [EH(kj)] 
to AS but MITM attacker is able to intercept it, a man-
in-the-middle attack can begin. MITM attacker sends 
a forged message (Mf) to AS that claims to be from 
EH, but instead includes MITM attacker’s public key 
(Akj). AS, believing the (Akj) to be [EH(kj)], encrypts 
the secret key with MITH attacker’s public key [i.e. 
[E(ks); Akj]] and sends the EA(ks) to EH. MITM attacker 
again intercepts EA(ks), decrypt it (i.e. DA[EA(ks)]) 
using its private key (Aki) and re-encrypt it using the 
EH(kj) originally sent to AS [i.e. [EA[D[E(ks)]]; EH(kj)]]. 
When EH receives [EA[D[E(ks)]]; EH(kj)], the newly 
encrypted secret key, it believes it came from AS. 
Now, it becomes obvious that MITM has the secret 
key to decrypt any message transmitted between 
the task agent and the execution host which can 
also be sniffed by the MITM as shown in Figure 5. The 
secret key known to MITM can be used to lunch a 
severe attack on future communication between the 
task agent and the execution host.  
 
 
1. AS:  AS   request (EH(kj)) 
2. EH:  MITM  EH(kj)/* MITM intercepts */ 
                 /*EH(kj) meant for AS */ 
3. MITM:  AS  MITM (Mf, Akj) 
4. AS:  [E(Sk); Akj] 
5. AS:  MITM  [E(Sk); Akj] /*MITM again*/     
                 /*intercepts or sniffs*/  
                 /*E(Sk) meant for EH */ 
6. MITM:  [DA[E(Sk)]; Aki] 
7. MITM: [EA[DA[E(Sk)]]; EH(kj)] 
8. MITM:  EH  [EA[DA[E(Sk)]]; EH(kj)] 
9. EH:   TA  request (Mf ) 
10. TA:  MITM  Mf /* MITM intercepts*/  
       /*the message for meant for EH */ 
11. MITM:  [D[Mf )]; Sk] 
 
Figure 5 MITM attack during communication between 
agent server and execution host 
 
 
Similarly, MITM can occur during the conversation 
between the TA and EH. When the EH requests for the 
certificate of a TA as a proof of identity, an MITM 
making independent connection with the 
communication channel can capture and keep the 
request made by the EH and sends its certificate 
(EHcert) request to the TA. The TA sends its certificate 
(TAcert) to the MITM, which it keeps and forwards its 
certificate (Acert) to the EH. EH believes that the 
response received is from TA and hence 
communicate directly to the MITM ignorantly. This 
scenario is illustrated in Figure 6. 
Agent 
controller
Agent 
container
Execution Host
Network server
Task
agent
Agent 
container
MITM 
attacker
 
Figure 6 Man-in-the-middle attack without the proposed 
mechanism 
 
 
The proposed mechanism isolates the MITM such 
that it is cut off completely from interacting or 
communicating with any other entity outside its 
container as shown in Figure 7. If the MITM attempts 
to launch an attack on the TA’s transmission to the 
AC in EH or reference the legitimate TAs running on 
EH, it provokes a type error. This makes MITM attack 
practically impossible and hence preserves the 
confidentiality of TA communication with the 
execution host. 
 
Agent 
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Agent 
container
Execution Host
Network server
Task
agent
Agent 
container
Confined execution
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External agent
MITM 
attacker
 
Figure 7 Man-in-the-middle attack with the proposed 
mechanism 
 
 
4.2 Replay Attack with and without the Proposed 
Mechanism 
 
A replay attack occurs when the certificate request 
made by the execution host on the task agent is 
copied by an adversary and retransmitted to the task 
agent. It also occurs when the certificate transmitted 
by the task agent intentionally to the execution host 
is copied and retransmitted to the execution host. 
When TA arrives at EH, it is mandatory the TA proves 
its identity to EH. For this to happen, EH requests TA 
certificate (TAcert) as proof of identity, which the 
agent dutifully provides after some transactions like 
hashing. At this time, suppose a replay attacker (RA) 
eavesdrops on the conversation and keeps TAcert (or 
the hash value). After the conversation is over, then 
RA posing as legitimate TA connects to EH, and sends 
the legitimate TAcert (or hash value) read from the last 
session for a proof of identity as shown in Figure 8. The 
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EH having accepts TAcert thus granting access to RA. 
At this time, the confidentiality of TAcert has been 
breached and such stolen certificate can be used 
by RA to lunch impersonation attack on the 
legitimate TA. This scenario is illustrated in Figure 8 
with the notational procedure in Figure 9. 
 
Agent 
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Agent 
container
Execution Host
Network server
Task
agent
Agent 
container
Confined 
execution
Environment for 
External agent
MITM 
attacker
 
Figure 8 Replay attack without the proposed mechanism 
 
1. EH:  TA  request TAcert 
2. EH:  RA  TAcert  /*RA connects and keeps 
           TAcert */ 
3. RA:  EH  TAcert  /*RA transmit TAcert to EH*/ 
 
Figure 9 Replay attack during communication between task 
agent and execution host 
 
 
When TA launches a replay attack on the 
communication between a TA and the EH, the 
proposed mechanism prevents illegal connection 
with the channel through which attack can takes 
place. The faded connection shown in Figure 10 
shows unsuccessful connection attempts made by 
RA. 
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Figure 10 Replay attack with the proposed mechanism 
 
 
4.3 Eavesdropping Attack with and without the 
Proposed Mechanism 
 
Eavesdropping is an unauthorized real-time 
interception of a private communication between 
two or more entities. This type of communication 
interception does not require physical connection to 
the communication channel but rather the 
eavesdropper spies or listen to the conversations 
between the communicating entities. 
It is worth noted that the two categories of attacks 
described above are also eavesdropping attacks. 
They are often referred to as active eavesdropping 
attacks. However, an eavesdropping attack can also 
be passive such that passive eavesdropper neither 
interacts with TA nor with the communication 
channel, but spies or listens to agent communication 
thereby compromises its confidentiality as shown in 
Figure 11 and illustrated in Figure 12. From Figure 11, it 
can be observed that the eavesdropper, having set 
to eavesdrop, records all the communication 
between the task agent and the execution host 
thereby compromising the confidentiality of task 
agent certificate. 
 
1. EA: Set spy alert /* EA is set to spy  
            communication between EH & TA */ 
2. EH: TA  request TAcert 
3. TA: EH  TAcert 
4. TA: EA  TAcert    /* TA certificate is  
                   leaked to EA */ 
 
Figure 11 Spy activity of eavesdropper during 
communication between task agent and execution host 
 
Agent 
controller
Agent 
container
Execution Host
Network server
Task
agent
Agent 
container
Passive 
eavesdropper
 
Figure 12 Eavesdropping attack without the proposed 
mechanism 
 
 
Similar to overcoming active eavesdropping, the 
proposed mechanism also makes the eavesdropper 
deaf to the activities outside the activity-space 
established for the external agent as shown in Figure 
13. The agent is masked from listening to the 
conversations outside its execution environment 
thereby making passive eavesdropping practically 
impossible for the external agent. 
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Figure 13 Eavesdropping attack with the proposed 
mechanism 
 
 
5.0  CONCLUSION 
 
This paper presents a restriction-based access control 
mechanism (ResBAC) for inter-confidentiality 
protection of agent communication. It was a 
technique adopted in this study to direct visiting 
agent to a desired neutral host for execution and at 
the same time isolates it to disable its ability to 
communicate with the legitimate task agents. The 
isolation of the visiting agent was achieved by 
restriction-based access control, which establishes an 
activity-space for the visiting agent such that none of 
its activities can extend beyond the boundary of the 
activity-space. This was used to limit what the visiting 
agent can do [21] especially its communication 
coverage.  
For a visiting agent to be admitted into the 
receiving network domain, the sending and the 
receiving network domains must undergo mutual 
authentication. The visiting agent must also be 
authenticated to establish its identity at the receiving 
network domain. In this research, the performance of 
ResBAC is evaluated using six different scenarios to 
measure the strength and justify the efficiency of the 
mechanism in handling the major security threats to 
agent communication. The security threat comprises 
man-in-the-middle (MITM), replay, and passive 
eavesdropping attacks. The MITM and replay attacks 
are also called active eavesdropping attacks. The 
main achievement of this research is the design of a 
novel restriction-based access control mechanism to 
isolate visiting agent to a neutral host to prevent 
possible attack on the communication between the 
legitimate task agents and the execution host. The 
mechanism is based on JADE framework and 
implements agent communication based on FIPA-
ACL, where a malicious agent (MA) is created and 
equipped with the capability of probing into the 
communication between the task agents and the 
agent controller in the execution host. 
 
 
 
 
Acknowledgement 
 
We wish to acknowledge the research supports 
provided by Universiti Teknologi Malaysia and The 
Federal Polytechnic, Ado-Ekiti, Nigeria. We also wish 
to appreciate the efforts of the anonymous reviewers 
whose corrections and suggestions have added 
value to this article. 
 
 
References 
 
[1] Li, N. 2011. Discretionary Access Control. Encyclopedia of 
Cryptography and Security. 353-356. 
[2] Ni, Q., et al. 2010. Privacy-Aware Role-Based Access 
Control. ACM Transactions on Information and System 
Security (TISSEC). 13(3): 24. 
[3] Gray, E., et al. 2002. Towards a Framework for Assessing 
Trust-based Admission Control in Collaborative Ad Hoc 
Applications. Dept. of Computer Science, Trinity College 
Dublin, Technical Report. 66. 
[4] Zhao, Y. L. and C. F. Jiang. 2014. Research of Access 
Control Models in Personal Networks. In Advanced 
Materials Research. Trans Tech Publ. 
[5] Hur, J. and D. K. Noh. 2011. Attribute-Based Access 
Control with Efficient Revocation in Data Outsourcing 
Systems. Parallel and Distributed Systems, IEEE Transactions 
on. 22(7): 1214-1221. 
[6] Hu, V. C., D. R. Kuhn, and D. F. Ferraiolo. 2015. Attribute-
Based Access Control. Computer. 2015(2): 85-88. 
[7] Sahai, A. and B. Waters. 2005. Fuzzy Identity-Based 
Encryption. In Advances in Cryptology–EUROCRYPT 2005. 
Springer. 457-473. 
[8] Carrie, E. G. 2007. Access Control Requirements for Web 
2.0 Security and Privacy. In Proc. of Workshop on Web 2.0 
Security & Privacy (W2SP 2007. Citeseer. 
[9] Fong, P. W. 2011. Relationship-Based Access Control: 
Protection Model and Policy Language. In Proceedings of 
the first ACM conference on Data and application 
security and privacy. ACM. 
[10] Hammoutene, M., M. Petkovic, and C. V. Conrado. 2013. 
Role-based Access Control. Google Patents. 
[11] Alturi, V. and D. Ferraiolo. 2011. Role-Based Access 
Control. In Encyclopedia of Cryptography and Security.  
Springer. 1053-1055. 
[12] Joshi, S. 2010. Role-Based Access Control. Google Patents. 
[13] Tsai, W.-T. and Q. Shao. 2011. Role-Based Access-Control 
Using Reference Ontology in Clouds. In Autonomous 
Decentralized Systems (ISADS), 2011 10th International 
Symposium on. IEEE. 
[14] Chen, L. and J. Crampton. 2012. Risk-Aware Role-Based 
Access Control. In Security and Trust Management. 
Springer. 140-156. 
[15] Bilaney, R. P. and S. R. Devasahayam. 2014. Claims-Aware 
Role-Based Access Control. Google Patents. 
[16] Yu, D. 2012. Role and Task-Based Access Control Model for 
Web Service Integration. Journal of Computational 
Information Systems. 8: 2012(7). 
[17] Deng, J.-B. and F. Hong. 2003. Task-Based Access Control 
Model. Journal of Software. 14(1): 76-82. 
[18] Santos-Pereira, C., et al. 2013. A Secure RBAC Mobile 
Agent Access Control Model for Healthcare Institutions. In 
Computer-Based Medical Systems (CBMS), 2013 IEEE 26th 
International Symposium on. IEEE. 
[19] FERREIRAabd, A., et al. 2007. Access Control: How Can It 
Improve Patients’ Healthcare? Medical and Care 
Compunetics. 4(4): 65. 
[20] Eastlake, D. and P. Jones. 2001. US Secure Hash Algorithm 
1 (SHA1), RFC 3174, September. 
[21] Claessens, J., B. Preneel, and J. Vandewalle. 2003. (How) 
Can Mobile Agents Do Secure Electronic Transactions on 
10                              Olumide, Shukor & Abdul Hanan / Jurnal Teknologi (Sciences & Engineering) 77:13 (2015) 1–10 
 
 
Untrusted Hosts? A Survey of the Security Issues and the 
Current Solutions. ACM Transactions on Internet 
Technology (TOIT). 3(1): 28-48. 
 
